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Data Envelopment Analysis requires all the units that are being compared to be 
homogeneous.  One of the homogeneity requirements is that they all share the same inputs 
and outputs.  In practice this is often not the case, as some units carry out more activities than 
others and may use more inputs to create more outputs than the rest.  In an extreme case, 
some Decision Making Units (DMUs) may specialise in a single activity while others may 
aim for diversification.  We present a new model that can estimate efficiencies for the various 
activities, even when some DMUs do not engage in some of the activities and do not share 
the same set of inputs/outputs with the remaining DMUS.  The model is demonstrated with 
some data from the literature. 
 






Although Data Envelopment Analysis has gone a long way since it was formulated in 
1957 (Farrell, 1957), there are still some problems whose solution remains unsatisfactory, 
one of them being homogeneity. Homogeneity is a key assumption within Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) where all Decision Making Units (DMUs) are required to conform to three 
rules: first, they should undertake the same processes; second, they should use the same 
inputs to produce the same outputs; lastly, it is required that they operate within the same 
environment (Dyson et al., 2001, Haas and Murphy, 2003).   
In practice, homogeneity is seldom present.  It is common for data sets to contain non-
homogeneous units.   For instance, we may be interested in assessing the efficiency of bank 
branches.  Homogeneity would require all of them to engage in the same activities, but large 
branches will carry out most banking activities, whilst smaller branches may only engage in 
some of them.  Standard use of DEA would prevent direct efficiency comparisons between 
small and large bank branches.   Two ways of proceeding have been followed under these 
circumstances, either to base the analysis on a limited number of activities shared by all 
DMUs; or study only a limited number of DMUs that engage in exactly the same activities.  
Both solutions are clearly unsatisfactory. 
Many attempts have been made in the past to study efficiency when DMUs were not 
homogeneous.  Sarrico and Dyson (2000) tried to compare the efficiency of departments at 
Warwick University.  They found that not all departments shared the same inputs: Science 
departments required laboratories and equipment while a Humanities department did not.   
They overcame this problem by running a DEA model for each department against external 
competitors in the same area, a very different matter from comparing departments within a 
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university, the objective they had originally set to achieve.  Another example is provided by 
Athanassopoulos and Thanassoulis (1991) who studied efficiency in the brewery industry, 
and tried to overcome the problem of non-homogeneity by grouping breweries into those that 
had passing trade and those that did not.  The breweries were then analysis separately and 
gained an efficiency score within their group but, again, this is not an ideal solution. 
Non-homogeneity was also encountered by Ray (1991) when studying public schools;  
by Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992) in the area of nursing homes; by Sexton et al. (1994) in 
pupil transport; and by Zenios et al. (1999), and Soteriou and Zenios (1999) in banking.  All 
of them devised ad hoc rules in order to deal with this problem. 
 A popular way to deal with the homogeneity problem is by using a two-step 
procedure.  In the first step, DEA scores are calculated, and in the second step, these scores 
are regressed against possible causes of non-homogeneity that had not been included in the 
original formulation.  Examples are: Ray (1991), Sexton et al. (1994), Fizel and Nunnikhoven 
(1992), Mancebon and Mar Molinero (2000), and (Haas and Murphy, 2003).   
Here we propose a new approach to a common form of non-homogeneity, the one 
encountered when not all DMUs share the same inputs and/or outputs.  The model proposed 
is an extension of the DEA model for joint determination of efficiency when several activities 
take place at the same time (Mar Molinero and Tsai, 1997).   
The rationale of this new model will be presented and the model formulated.  
Equations will be given for the envelopment and the ratio form of the model.  The model will 
be demonstrated with some standard data from the literature (Beasley, 1995).  The paper will 
end with a concluding section. 
                   
 6 
The Model 
For clarity of presentation, it will be assumed that we are trying to assess efficiency in 
university level institutions.  There will be three types of university institutions in the 
assumed data set: those, such as standard universities, that engage in both teaching (T) and 
research (R); those that engage in teaching but not in research; and those, such as research 
institutes, that engage in research but not in teaching.  We would like to study the efficiency 
with which these institutions conduct the R and the T functions by using the complete, non-
homogeneous, data set.  In the case of institutions that perform both the T and the R function, 
this will involve estimating a DEA score for the T activity and a DEA score for the R 
activity.   
This problem has another interpretation.  We are, in fact, asking the question of 
whether it is better to specialise (leave the T function to T only institutions, and the R 
function to R only institutions), or to diversify (conduct both activities jointly).  We have not 
found any other attempt in the DEA literature of addressing the diversification versus 
specialisation issue. 
As in any DEA problem, there are two formulations for the model: the ratio form, and 
the envelopment form.  We think that the philosophy of the modelling procedure is better 
understood within a ratio formulation, although we will mathematically formulate the 
equations for the envelopment form.  The ratio form of the model will also be given for 
completeness. 
The standard DEA model, in the ratio formulation, is often interpreted as follows. 
“Take the DMU whose efficiency we wish to assess.  Define efficiency as the ratio of 
weighted outputs to weighted inputs.  The DMU under observation is allowed to choose the 
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weights to be used in this ratio so that its efficiency is maximised, but once such weights are 
chosen they are applied to study the efficiency of the remaining DMUs in the data set.  If, 
using the same weights as the DMU under observation, no other DMU achieves a higher 
level of efficiency, the DMU under observation is efficient.  If, using the same weights as the 
DMU under observation, other DMUs achieve higher efficiencies, the DMU under 
observation is inefficient”.  Of course, this story needs to be completed with the conditions 
that the weights need to be strictly positive, and that efficiencies are positive numbers 
between zero and one. 
The problem of estimating the efficiencies of activities that are jointly performed was 
studied, under constant returns to scale, by Beasley (1995), Mar Molinero (1996), and Mar 
Molinero and Tsai (1997); and, under variable returns to scale, by Tsai and Mar Molinero 
(2002).   This model has been applied to the UK health service by Tsai and Mar-Molinero 
(2002), to police forces in Spain by Diez-Ticio and Mancebon (2002), to the study of 
education costs by Salerno (2006), and to bus services in Taiwan by Yu (2007). 
Under the joint efficiency model, some inputs are allocated only to the T activity, 
some inputs are shared between the T and R activities, and some inputs are allocated only to 
the R activities.  In the same way, some outputs can be attributed to the T activity, some 
outputs reflect the effort devoted to the T or the R activity, and some outputs depend only on 
the R activity.  The DMU under observation has to decide how to allocate shared inputs to the 
R or to the T activities, and how much effort to devote to produce outputs from the T or the R 
activities.  This it does by taking into account the importance attached to the T activity, the 
importance attached to the R activity, and the desire to be seen to be operating as efficiently 
as possible under both activities when compared with other DMUs.   
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The rationale of joint efficiency DEA algorithm is based on the same philosophy as 
before: once the DMU under observation has decided how to allocate shared inputs, and how 
to attribute shared outputs, this split is applied to all other DMUs and efficiency calculations 
take place as usual.  Efficiency calculations can take place as usual because once the split of 
shared inputs and the split of shared outputs have been decided, we face a standard DEA 
problem for the T activity, and a standard DEA problem for the R activity. 
 The ability to split the joint problem into a T problem and a R problem allows us to 
incorporate the T only institutions, which will be compared with the T part of the institutions 
that engage in both T and R activities; and R only institutions, which will be compared with 
the R part of the institutions that engage in both T and R. 
We now give the mathematical formulation for the complete model.   This requires 
introducing notation. 
Let there be I outputs, and J inputs.  Let there be S DMUs that engage in both T and 
R, P DMUs that only engage in T, and Z DMUs that only engage in R.  Let the DMU whose 
T and R efficiencies we wish to calculate be indexed as k.  We will be calculating efficiencies 
under the output oriented formulation with variable returns to scale.  The model can be 
modified in order to accommodate other formulations. 
yisT   is the amount of output i associated only with the T activity for DMU s. 
yisR  is the amount of output i associated only with the R activity for DMU s.    
yisT R  is the amount of output i associated with both the T and the R activities for 
DMU s, of which a proportion b i can be attributed to the T activity and a proportion 1- b i can 
be attributed to the R activity. 
xjsT   is the amount of input j allocated only to the T activity of DMU s.    
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xjsR  is the amount of input j allocated only to the R activity of DMU s.    
xjsT R  is the amount of input j allocated in part to the T activity and in part to the R 
activity of DMU s.   A proportion mj is allocated to the T activity, and a proportion 1-mj is 
allocated to the R activity. 
See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for a schematic representation of the structure of DMUs that 
engage in both T and R, DMUs that engage only in T, and DMUs that engage only in R.   
 
Figure 1.- Structure of a DMU that engages jointly in T and R 
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Figure 2.- Structure of a DMU that engages only in the T activity 
 
Figure 3.- Structure of a DMU that engages only in the R activity. 
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lsT  is the DEA multiplier for the T activity of DMU s. 
lsR is the DEA multiplier for the R activity of DMU s. 
wkT  is the inverse of the T efficiency for the DMU under observation, k. 
wkR is the inverse of the R efficiency for the DMU under observation, k. 
  The importance attached to the T activity and to the R activity is captured by the 
weights qT  and qR.  These weights are determined outside the model and reflect the priorities 
of the decision maker.  It is customary to choose them so that they add up to unity. 
Finally, let the overall efficiency of DMU k be measured by ek.   
We are now in a position to write down the equations for the model. 










  [1] 
We will now turn to the constraints and we will start with the inputs.  Institutions that 
engage in both the T and the R activities may use some inputs that are specific to the T 
function, while institutions that only engage in the T activity (and do not engage at all in the 
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There will be a similar equation for each of the inputs that are allocated only to the R 
activity by institutions that engage in both T and R.  These inputs could also be allocated to R 
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In line with the formulation given by Mar-Molinero (1996), inputs that can be 
allocated in part to the T activity and in part to the R activity will produce only one equa tion.  
These inputs could also be allocated to T only institutions, and used only for T purposes, or 
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We now turn to the constraints associated with outputs.  Outputs that are only the 
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s ll  [9] 
It is possible for this formulation to produce outputs without any inputs by, for 
example, setting the value of µj either to zero or to one.  To avoid the possibility of producing 
outputs without inputs we need some further constraints:  
 jjj Mm ££ m  [10] 
where mj is a number greater than zero and Mj is a number smaller than one.  In the 
same way:  
 iii Bb ££ b  [11] 
where bi is a number greater than zero and Bi is a number smaller than one. 
The formulation is completed with the usual limiting conditions that require that all 
unknowns be positive.  The efficiency factors wT  and wR are required to be greater than one, 
but the model ensures this automatically. 
This model will fail to produce reasonable results if either equations [4] or [7] hold in 
the form of inequalities, and for this reason a penalty function that depends on the value of 
the slack variables is added to the objective during the estimation. 
If the DMU under observation, k, is of the T only kind, we need to proceed in two 
steps.  In the first step we identify the optimal values of mj and b i for each T and R DMU.  
Using these values we can identify the amount of inputs that a T and R DMU allocates only 
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to T, and the amount of outputs that the T and R DMU derives only from T.  A standard DEA 
model is then run for the T only activity, in which DMUs are the T part of a T and R DMU, 




The model described by equations [1] to [11] is not linear, since there are products of 
unknowns in the constraints such as, for example lsT  mj.  It is, however, possible to write 
down the extended Lagrange formulation for this model and use it to derive the dual.  The 
derivations, which are very much the same as in Mar Molinero and Tsai (1997), will not be 
presented here, only the final results. 
The dual assigns a shadow price to each constraint.  It is convenient at this stage to 
make a distinction between inputs that are allocated only to the T activity, inputs that are 
allocated only to the R activity, and inputs that are shared between the T and the R activity.  
Let the shadow price assigned to inputs allocated to T only be ujT, let the shadow price 
assigned to inputs allocated to R only be ujR, and let the shadow price assigned to inputs 
shared between T and R be ujTR.  We define equally, the shadow prices associated with T only 
outputs, R only outputs, and outputs generated by both T and R as viT, viR, and viTR.  There 
will also be a dual variable associated with each variable returns to scale constraint: uoT , and 
uoR.   
Each DMU involved in both T and R, s, generates two dual constraints, one 





















































































































Equation [14] reflects the fact that a T only institution will allocate any TR input or 
output in its totality to the T activity.   
In the same way, DMUs that are only involved in the R activity, z, will produce a 





































The objective function aims at maximising the valuation of all inputs used by DMU k, 
whether from T or from R, divided by the valuation of all inputs used, irrespective from its 

















































If the DMU under observation is T only, equation [16] will not contain the 
summations iÎR neither at the numerator, nor at the denominator; and if it is R only, it will 
not contain the summations iÎT. 
 
Application 
The model will be demonstrated on some data for university physics departments 
provided by Beasley (1995).  Each physics department is a DMU.  In Beasley’s paper there 
are only two activities: Teaching and Research.  In this paper we will consider three 
activities: undergraduate teaching (UT), postgraduate teaching (PT), and research (R).  For 
the purposes of this paper we will consider all three activities to be of equal importance; i.e., 
the weights qUT , qPT and qR were each set to one third in the objective function when all three 
activities were present.  When a department did not engage in PT, the weight qPT did not 
appear in the objective function, and the other two weights were set to one half each. 
Beasley’s data set is not homogeneous, as there are many DMUs that do not engage in 
PT.  It is exactly the situation that can be modelled with the equations presented here.  
We will use the same inputs as Beasley: equipment expenditure, and general 
expenditure.  DMUs will attempt to allocate these expenditures between the activities. A 
lower limit of 0.1 and an upper limit of 0.9 were set for the proportions in which these shared 
inputs can be divided. 
 17 
The number of undergraduate students is the output of the UT activity.  The number 
of postgraduate students is the output of the PT activity.  Given the way in which universities 
work in the UK, this is a reasonable distinction to make, as engaging in postgraduate teaching 
is a departmental decision, while undergraduate teaching is the result of a national negotiation 
between the funding bodies and the universities.  As in Beasley, the research activity 
generates research students and research income.  Beasley uses a third output for the R 
activity, research rating, but this is not used in this paper.   The structure used in this example 
for the departments that engage in all three activities can be seen in Figure 4, and for 
departments that do not engage in PT, in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 4.- Structure for the example.  Departments that engage in UT, PT, and R. 
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Figure 5.- Structure for the example.  Departments that engage only in UT, and R. 
The model was estimated with specially written software using the package LINGO.  
The results are shown in Table 1.  It is seen that only two departments are 100% efficient, and  
that these are departments that do not carry out the PT activity.   There are also a number of 
departments that are efficient in certain activities, but not overall.  Whilst the model is not the 
exact replica of Beasley’s (1995), it does show similar results within the overall efficiencies.    
Conclusion 
This paper has explored a new way of dealing with one type of non-homogeneity in 
DEA, the one that manifests itself when some Decision Making Units do not carry out the 
same activities as others, and they do not share some inputs or outputs.   
Direct comparisons of non-homogeneous units can now be made without the need for 
unnecessary assumptions within the model.  This paper has looked at how the models 
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formulation works and shows the dual calculations.  Beasley’s (1995) data has been used as 














Aberdeen 6.61% 19.77% 30.10% 2.70% 
Aberystwyth 10.41% 15.63% 25.41% 5.41% 
Bangor 15.83% 14.14% 17.97% N/A 
Bath 42.78% 33.88% 58.01% N/A 
Birmingham 46.72% 73.05% 36.49% 43.24% 
Bradford 7.58% 56.64% 3.87% 8.33% 
Bristol 47.24% 52.76% 42.77% N/A 
Brunel 28.46% 20.35% 100.00% 21.62% 
Cambridge 25.44% 64.71% 100.00% 10.81% 
Cardiff 26.57% 29.03% 24.49% N/A 
Dundee 28.30% 29.58% 18.05% 59.51% 
Durham 42.56% 37.32% 49.53% N/A 
East Anglia 24.36% 13.87% 100.00% N/A 
Edinburgh 7.03% 58.94% 25.14% 2.70% 
Essex 28.11% 17.19% 37.34% 45.95% 
Exeter 30.59% 47.39% 22.59% N/A 
Glasgow 13.45% 78.55% 39.44% 5.41% 
Herriot-Watt 6.78% 32.48% 23.80% 2.70% 
Hull 33.69% 25.55% 49.45% N/A 
Keele 27.99% 24.74% 32.21% N/A 
Kent 34.37% 29.61% 40.98% N/A 
Lancaster 30.15% 24.82% 45.03% 27.03% 
Leeds 32.17% 31.07% 33.35% N/A 
Leicester 38.18% 31.02% 49.65% N/A 
Liverpool 29.76% 32.35% 23.01% 37.84% 
London Birkbeck 13.98% 5.15% 100.00% 97.30% 
London Imperial  76.87% 99.09% 77.84% 62.16% 
London KQC 44.53% 36.40% 57.34% N/A 
London Q. Mary 20.50% 39.95% 20.28% 13.89% 
London R. Hol & Bed 21.62% 33.40% 61.26% 10.81% 
London Univ. Coll. 7.55% 40.51% 100.00% 2.76% 
Loughborough 36.89% 28.54% 52.17% N/A 
Manchester 71.21% 64.89% 74.05% 75.68% 
Newcastle 45.03% 35.65% 100.00% 35.00% 
Nottingham 46.93% 46.51% 47.36% N/A 
Oxford 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% N/A 
Reading 27.83% 20.14% 22.57% 72.22% 
Salford 37.84% 29.39% 41.52% 47.22% 
Sheffield 7.12% 61.27% 28.44% 2.70% 
Southampton 39.67% 41.69% 32.24% 48.51% 
St. Andrews 44.85% 29.55% 81.50% 48.13% 
Stirling 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% N/A 
Strathclyde 42.15% 57.06% 33.42% N/A 
Surrey 44.60% 21.87% 86.55% 100.00% 
Sussex 51.26% 37.77% 64.54% 60.39% 
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Swansea 22.17% 19.87% 31.11% 18.92% 
UMIST 33.28% 23.71% 55.79% N/A 
Warwick 42.75% 39.89% 46.05% N/A 
York 15.77% 27.76% 32.41% 8.11% 
 
Table 1.  Results for the joint estimation of efficiencies in the non-homogeneous data set.  
N/A means that the particular department does not engage in this activity and this efficiency 
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